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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does the Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act, which allows public access to
truthful information about convicted sex offenders and does not take any rights away
from a sex offender, violate the Due Process Clause of the United Slates Constitution?
2. Does the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, which the legislature intended to be
regulatory and which does not in fact punish sex offenders, violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the United Slates Constitution?
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Petitioners respectfully submit this brief and request that this Court REVERSE the
judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the due process claim
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the ex post facto claim.
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United Slates Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reported at
Doe V- Dept, of Public Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001). The opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported at Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9lh Cir. 2001).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The constitutional provisions relevant to the disposition of this case are Article 1, Section
10 of the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United Slates
Constitution. The statutory provisions relevant to the disposition of this case are sections 54-250
ct seq. of the Connecticut General Statutes and sections 11.56.835 - .840, 12.63.010 - .100 and
18.65.087 of the Alaska Statutes.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
In 1999, the Connecticut legislature revised its sexual offender registration law
("CSORA”). (J.A. 26.) During that same year, John Doe and Samuel Poe, sex offenders, filed
suit against Henry C. Lee, director of the Department of Public Safety, William Carbone, the
director of Office of Adult Probation, and John Armstrong, the commissioner of the Department
of Corrections. (J.A. 3-4.) On November 14, 2000, Doe and Poe filed their fourth amended
complaint alleging that CSORA violated 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
United Slates Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(J.A. 3.) The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (J.A. 7-8.)
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On March 31, 2001, United States District Court ruled on the summarv'judgment motions
findins that CSORA violated the Due Process Clause and 42 U.S.C. section 1983 but denying
the Ex Post Facto claim. (J.A. 24.) The court issued a permanent injunction requiring that the
state immediately take down the sex offender registry website and refrain from disseminating the
sex offender registry information to the public. (J.A. 56.) On May 18, 2001, the defendants
appealed. (J.A. 59, 73.) On October 19, 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. (J.A. 78.) On May 20, 2002, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari. (J.A. 108.)
On May 13, 1994, two convicted sex offenders, John Doe I and 11, both subject to the
registration requirements of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (“ASORA ), and Jane
Rowe, the wife of John Doe I, brought suit claiming, among other things, that ASORA violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. (J.A. 138, 143.) The United States
District Court of Alaska granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting public disclosure of the
registration requirements, but requiring the plaintiffs to register under ASORA. (J.A. 197, 213.)
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (J.A. 109.) The district court held that
ASORA did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. (J.A. 138-85.) The United States Court of
Appeals for Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the registration and notification provisions of
ASORA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. (J.A. 138-85.) On February 19, 2002, this Court
granted certiorari (J.A. 138-85.) On August 23, 2002, this Court consolidated the Second
Circuit and Ninth Circuit cases. (J.A. 230.)
Statement of Facts
In 1994, Megan Kanka, an unsuspecting seven-year-old child, was sexually assaulted and
murdered. (J.A. 81.) The sex offender and murderer was her neighbor, a twice convicted sex
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offender. (J.A. 81.) Following this tragic incident, the New Jersey legislature enacted “Megan’s
Law” to identify sex offenders and alert parents to their presence so that they can take proper
precautionary measures. (J.A. 81.) Soon thereafter, Congress passed a law requiring states to
register all sex offenders. (J.A. 26.) The statute also required states to provide information to
the

local law enforcement officers and the public. (J.A. 26.) If a state fails to register sex

offenders, the Federal government may withhold federal funds. (J.A. 81.) To comply with this
regulation, Connecticut passed the Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act. (J.A. 81.)
Connecticut’s law requires offenders to register if they have committed crimes in the following
categories: 1) criminal offenses against a victim who is a minor, 2) nonviolent sexual offenses, 3)
sexually violent offenses, and 4) felonies committed for a sexual purpose. (J.A. 81.)
A person convicted of either a “criminal offense against a victim who is a minor” or a
“nonviolent sexual offense” only has to register for ten years. (J.A. 8.) Offenders with multiple
convictions or those convicted of a single sexually violent offense must register for life. (J.A. 9.)
All registrants must provide the Department of Public Safety with their name, address, criminal
record, fingerprints, a photograph and a description of other identifying characteristics. (J.A.
26.) They must submit a blood sample for DNA analysis, unless they have previously submitted
a sample. (J.A. 9.) If the offender moves, he or she must mail the Commissioner the new
address within five days. (J.A. 11.) Either once a year or every ninety days depending on the
seriousness of the original crime, the offender must mail in an address verification form. (J.A.
11.) If sex offenders fail to comply with the requirements of CSORA they can be charged with a
class D felony. (J.A. 10.)
CSORA requires that the sex offender registry be available at the local police stations, the
Department of Public Safety, each state police troop in Connecticut and on the Internet. (J.A.
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12.) The website contains the offenders name, the crime for which he is registered, his current
address, a physical description and a photograph. (J.A. 30-31.) The website also contains a
disclaimer stating that the Department of Public Safety “has made no deienninaiion that any
individual included in the Registry is currently dangerous.” (J.A. 31.) The disclaimer further
slates that the purpose of providing the website “is to make this information more readily
available and accessible, not to warn about any specific individual.” (J.A. 31.)
CSORA allows for both court-ordered exemptions from registration and restrictions on
the dissemination of registration information. (J.A. 9, 13.) The court may restrict the
dissemination of information to law enforcement if it finds that the information would be likely
to reveal the identity of the victim and where it is not needed to protect public safety. (J.A. 13.)
CSORA also allows certain classes of offenders to petition the court to restrict the dissemination
of their information. (J.A. 29.) Offenders convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental
disease or defect between October 1, 1988 and June 30, 1999 who committed various
enumerated offenses can petition the court regardless of their sentence or subsequent criminal
history. ( J.A. 29.) Any offenders convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or
defect between October 1, 1988 and June 30, 1999 may petition the court if they ser\’ed no jail
time for their conviction, have not since been convicted of any crime which requires registration,
and have registered with the Department of Public Safety. (J.A. 15.)
In 1993, the Alaska State Legislature enacted the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act
(“ASORA”). (J.A. 139.) Prior to enactment, the legislature held detailed, comprehensive
hearings regarding the rate of recidivism among sexual offenders in the state of Alaska. (J.A.
139.) Testimony indicated that Alaska had the highest child sexual abuse rate in the nation —
approximately six times the national average. (J.A. 139.) Alaska also had the second highest
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sexual assault rate in the nation. (J.A. 139.) In the previous two years, the incidence of rape in
Alaska had increased 91%. (J.A. 139.) Testimony also indicated that approximately one-fourth
of Alaska’s prison inmates were incarcerated for sexual offenses. (J.A. 139.) In 1993, twice as
many sexual offenders were scheduled to be released than in the previous two years. (J.A. 13940.) Finally, studies showed an extremely high rate of recidivism among sex offenders. (J.A.
140.) As a result of the hearings, the Alaska state legislature issued the following findings:
(1) Sex offenders pose a high risk of re-offending after release from custody;
(2) Protecting the public from sex offenders is a primary governmental interest
(3) The privacy interests of persons convicted of sex offenses are less important
that the government’s interest in public safety; and
(4) Release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the
general public will assist in protecting the public safety
(J.A. 140.)
In order to protect the public from convicted sexual offenders, the Alaska state legislature
enacted ASORA. (J.A. 140.) ASORA requires sex offenders to register with local law
enforcement and be fingerprinted and photographed. (J.A. 141.) The registration requirements
end fifteen years after the sex offender’s unconditional discharge if they have been convicted of
only one offense. (J.A. 141, 14S, 158.) If an offender has been convicted of two or more
offenses, he must register so long as he resides in the state of Alaska. (J.A. 141.)
ASORA requires the Department of Safety to create a publicly accessible central registry
containing the offender’s name, date of birth, address, photograph, place of employment, and
public information about the conviction. (J.A. 141-42.) The Department of Public Safety has
made the registry available to the public on the Internet, “[i]n an ongoing effort to make Alaska
Communities safer and give the public easy access to information about people convicted of rape
or child molestation.” (J.A. 142.) The opening page of the website states, “This information is
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made available for the purpose of protecting the public. Anyone who uses this information to
commit a criminal act against another person is subject to criminal prosecution.*' (J.A. 142.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should uphold CSORA and ASORA. These acts provide the public with
accurate and truthful information regarding convicted sex offenders.
CSORA does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
registration and notification requirements of CSORA do not impinge on the sex offender’s
liberty or property interests. CSORA does not falsely stigmatize the sex offender as dangerous
because the website does not make a statement about the offender’s level of dangerousness. Any
negative effect that the registration might have on the sex offender comes from the independent
judgments that the public makes regarding the offender’s level of dangerousness.
The government should not be held responsible for the independent judgments that
citizens make when evaluating truthful information. Any damage to a sex offender’s reputation
comes not from being included on the list but from the fact that the person was convicted of a
sex offense. To hold the government responsible for the judgments that the public might make
when evaluating truthful information would severely hamper the government’s ability to
disseminate information. Any collection of facts might lead some people to make a negative
conclusion about a person, property or place. If the government is held liable for these
conclusions they could face numerous lawsuits and be forced to stop providing truthful, accurate
and useful information to the public.
In addition, CSORA’s registration requirements do not alter the sex offender’s legal
status. CSORA does not take away any right that the sex offender previously held. CSORA
does not falsely stigmatize and it does not alter the legal status of a sex offender. Therefore,
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CSORA does not implicate a liberty interest. Since CSORA does not impinge on a liberty or
property interest, it does violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
ASORA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The
Alaska State legislature’s findings demonstrate that they intended ASORA to be a regulator)’, not
a punitive measure. Under the Mendoza-Martinez test, neither the registration nor notification
provisions of the statute are punitive in fact. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144. 16S69 (1963). All of the Mendoza Martinez factors demonstrate that ASORA ser\'es to protect the
public from future sex crimes and does not punish sex offenders. Even if some of the factors
point toward a punitive finding, on balance, the two critical factors, affirmative disability and
restraint and alternative purpose, demonstrate that ASORA is not punitive in fact. The statute
does not impose an unduly harsh affirmative disability or restraint on sex offenders and any
social consequences faced by registrants are the result of their original conviction, not the actions
of the state in making available truthful information to the public. ASORA also has a significant
alternative purpose because it provides law enforcement with a regulatory scheme in order to
prevent future sex crimes and allows the public access to truthful information about sex
offenders in order to protect themselves and their families. The fact that ASORA has a
legitimate nonpunitive alternative purpose provides overtvhelming support for the legislature’s
original goal in enacting the statute.
Furthermore, the registration and notification provisions of ASORA should be examined
independently under the Mendoza-Martinez test. Examined alone, neither the registration nor
notification provisions satisfy the strict standard necessary for a punitive finding. For these
reasons, respondents have not shown by the clearest proof that the Mendoza-Martinez factors

S

iransfonn what was intended to be a regulatory measure into a punitive one. Thus, ASORA does
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CONNECTICUT SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT PROVIDES TRUTHFUL INFORMATION TO THE
PUBLIC AND DOES NOT IMPOSE A TANGIBLE BURDEN ON OR ALTER THE
STATUS OF THE CONVICTED SEX OFFENDER.
The Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act (CSORA) does not violate the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not deprive sex offenders of a
constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty or property. U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 1. If
there is a life, liberty or property interest at stake, then the sex offender is entitled to due process
of the law before the state takes that interest away. Id. This Court has established a two-step
process to examine procedural due process questions. Kentucky Dept, of Corr. v. Thompson.
490 U.S. 454 (1989). First, the court must examine whether the state has interfered with a liberty
or property interest. Id. Second, if the state has so interfered, the court must examine whether
the procedures surrounding the deprivation were constitutionally sufficient. Id.
CSORA does not deprive the sex offender of any life or property interest. See Conn,
Gen. Stat.§§ 54-250 et seq. (2002). CSORA does not violate the sex offender’s liberty interest
through governmental defamation. In Paul v. Davis, the Court found that injury to reputation
alone by a government action does not invoke the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). Rather, the Court set-out a two-part “Stigma Plus” test,
which governs due process claims based on governmental defamation. Id. at 709-10. The
claimant must show that a statement was made that injured his or her reputation, that the
statement could be proven false, and that the claimant alleges it is false. Id. The claimant must
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also prove an additional tangible burden, such as the deprivation of employment, or an alteration
of legal status. Id.
A.

CSORA Does Not Violate the First Prong of the Stigma Plus Test Because It
Does Not Create a False Stigma.

CSORA does not create a “stigma” because the government made no statement that
injured the sex offenders’ reputation and the list makes no statement that can be proven false.
1.

CSORA Does Not Violate the First Prong of the Stigma Plus Test Because
It Does Not Harm the Sex Offender’s Reputation.

Stigma requires harm to reputation. Paul, 424 U.S. at 709-10. CSORA does not harm
the sex offender’s reputation because the Department of Public Safety merely collects and
disseminates truthful information. The website makes no statement that could harm the sex
offender’s reputation. Any harm that would come to the sex offender’s reputation would not
stem from the list, but rather from committing a sexual offense. In Doe v. Kelley, the court,
examining a similar law, found no liberty interest. 961 F. Supp. 1105 (W.D. Mich. 1997). The
court staled, “Damage to plaintiffs’ reputation ... would appear to flow most directly from
plaintiffs’ own convicted misconduct and from private citizens’ reactions thereto, and only
tangentially from state action.” Id, at 1112. Similar to the statute in Kelley, any harm to the sex
offender’s reputation should not be attributed to their placement on the list, but rather to their
conviction. Since the list does not harm the sex offender’s reputation, it does not falsely
stigmatize the sex offender.
2.

CSORA Does Not Violate the First Prong of the Stigma Plus Test Because
It Makes Truthful Information Available to the Public.

If the Court finds that the publication of the truthful information harms the sex offender’s
reputation, CSORA still passes the first prong of the Stigma Plus test because nothing on the
website can be proven false. If the offender has complied with the requirements in CSORA, a

10

website visitor can click on his name and a page will appear slating the offender’s name, the
crime for which he is registered, his current address, a physical description and a photograph.
None of the information on the wesbsite is false. Thus, the sex offenders can point to no
government statement that is false.
Nothing on the website says that the sex offenders are presently dangerous. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the registry “implies that each person
listed is more likely than the average person to be currently dangerous.” Doe v. Dept, of Public
Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 2001). The Second Circuit pointed to no particular statement,
words or objects on the website that implied that the people listed were more dangerous than the
average citizen. Id The website also contains a Department of Public Safety disclaimer stating
the Department “has made no determination that any individual included in the Registr>^ is
currently dangerous.” The disclaimer goes on to say that the purpose of providing the website
“is to make this information more readily available and accessible, not to warn about any specific
individual.” There is no statement on the list that implies that the sex offenders are dangerous.
In no previous due process case stemming from governmental defamation has the mere
existence of a list containing truthful information implicated the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Paul v. Davis, the court found that the distribution of a flyer that contained
“active shoplifters” to store owners created a stigma. 424 U.S. at 693. The flyer contained a
photograph and the name of the person. Id. at 695. In addition, at the lop of each page of mug
shots was the heading “ACTIVE SHOPLIFTERS.” Id, The plaintiff was put on the list after
being arrested for shoplifting, but before his trial. Id, Despite the fact that the plaintiff had not
been convicted, the government distributed information claiming that he was a shoplifter. I^ at
696. The government also claimed that he was presently “active in this criminal field.” Id, at
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695. Both the assertion that Mr. Davis was a “shoplifter” and that he was “active" in the
criminal field were capable of being proven false. Therefore, even though the Court found
stigma in Paul, it did not come from the creation and publication of the list but from the fact that
the information on the list could be proven false.
In contrast to Paul, CSORA does not contain information that can be proven false. The
registry contains only people who have been convicted or who have pled guilty to a sex offense.
^ Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-250 (2), (5), (11), (12), 54-251(a), 54-252(a), 54-254(a). There is no
question as to the guilt or innocence of anyone on the registry. As opposed to Pa^, the registrymakes no statement about the present activity of anyone on the list. CSORA is distinguishable
from Paul because no statement on the list can be proven false.
In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, the Court found that a Wisconsin statute created a stigma.
400 U.S. 433, 434 (1970). Under the statute, various members of the community were pemiitted
to post notices stating that a person was an "excessive drinker." Id Local businesses were
prevented from selling alcohol to such persons. Id, For a person to be labeled an excessive
drinker the person writing the statement need only allege that the “excessive drinker" fit into one
or more of a series of subjective categories. Id, If the person was deemed to “waste or lessen his
estate so as to expose his family to want," or if he might through his consumption of alcohol
endanger any person’s property, the person could be deemed an excessive drinker. Id, To be
placed on this list someone needed to make a judgment about whether the person was an
excessive drinker and whether the drinking might lead to some future damages. The list was not
based on facts, but rather on subjective interpretations of individuals in the community. This
Court held that under the statute the government had made a statement that harmed an
individual’s reputation and could be proven false. Id,

12

The present case is distinguishable from Constantineau because registration cannot be
triggered through one person’s subjective beliefs. Rather, the only way a person gets on the list
is by being convicted in a criminal court with all the due process protections associated with such
a proceeding.

Conn. Gen. Stat.§§ 54-250 et. seq. As opposed to the statute in

Constantineau. the registry under CSORA only states that a person has previously been
convicted of a sex offense. Unlike the statute in Constantineau, CSORA provides the public
access to truthful information that cannot be proven false.
3.

The Government Is Not Responsible for Judgments People Make Based
on Truthful Information.

The Second Circuit contends that the very existence of the list itself implies that
registrants are more dangerous than the average person. Dept, of Public Safety, 271 F,3d at 49.
The court reaches this conclusion even though the website explicitly states that this is not what
the government is doing. Not only is this a novel approach to finding that the government is
causing a stigma, it is a departure from the existing law. See Paul. 424 U.S. 693. The Second
Circuit held the government responsible for the independent judgments that people make based
on the publication of true information. Such a holding goes too far. In Lanni v. Engler. a
Michigan court examining this issue found that any harm that came from the sex offender
registration statute was based on citizen’s independent judgment about the registrant being a
convicted sex offender. 994 F. Supp. 849, 855 (E.D. Mich. 1998). The court did not hold the
government responsible for the potential independent judgments of the public based on truthful
information. ^
4.

Upholding the Second Circuit’s Opinion Will Lead to Outrageous Results-

Holding the government responsible for the independent judgments people make will
lead to both drastic and harmful changes to sex offender registration acts across the country.
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First, if the Court finds that the existence of the list implies that registrants are more dangerous
than the average person, even though the website explicitly says that no dangerousness
determination has been made, it will be taking a step towards nationalizing a system that
Congress has largely left to the states. Federal law mandates states to collect this information
and says that the information “shall be released when necessary to protect public safety.” 42
U.S.C. § 14071(e) (2002). The law leaves it to the states to decide when and how the
information should be distributed. ^ As of 1999, nineteen states subjected sex offenders to
registration and notification based on statutorily defined offense-related criteria. Wayne A.
Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender
Community Notification Laws, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1167, 1175 (1999). Seven other
states allowed law enforcement to make a determination as to how dangerous a particular
offender is and how much notification is necessary. Id. Many other states only allowed a
hearing for certain classifications of offenders. ^ If the Court requires individual hearings for
everyone on the list, an overwhelming majority of states will have to drastically change their
systems. Id.
The Court would be forcing these states to enter an area that they consciously chose to
avoid - making individualized findings of dangerousness. After a very short time, and before it
is clear what procedures and levels of notification are most effective, the Court would be forcing
all states to proceed in a uniform fashion. When Congress required the states to notify the
public, they left it to the states to determine for themselves what constituted a threat to public
safety and how the notification would occur. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e). The effect of requiring an
individualized dangerousness assessment could cripple the states’ efforts to provide the public
with information about convicted sex offenders. As of 1999, California had 65,000 people on its
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registry. Humma Rasul, Danger in Numbers: California Updates its Version of Megan's Law
and Steps Further to Protect Our Children From Sex Offenders Living Together in Groups. 30
McGeorge L. Rev. 528, 536 (1999). The additional cost as well as the additional time and staff
required to make an individual determination for each person on the list might force many slates
not to publish any information about convicted sex offenders. This would directly conflict with
the purpose of the law and possibly lead to future tragedies.
Second, it is also not clear that the state’s assessment of dangerousness is any better than
an individual’s assessment of dangerousness. People have different tolerance levels for risk and
people have different opinions about who may be dangerous. Everyday parents draw on
numerous pieces of information to make conclusions about the safety or dangerousness of a
variety of activities for their children. The registry is simply one more tool for parents to use as
they make these assessments. Rather than require the state to make individual assessments of the
people on the list, the Court should allow the public to individually assess the people according
to their own beliefs about dangerousness. On numerous occasions this Court has recognized that
it is the parents fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody and control of
their children.

Troxell v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding that parents, not the slate,

has the right to decide who visits their children); Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)
(stating that the primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is established
beyond debate as an American tradition); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)
(affirming the right of the parents to direct the upbringing of their children). If the Court
mandates how and when this information should be collected and distributed, it will in effect be
shutting down the laboratories of social experimentation without knowing that it is implementing
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the most effective model.' Therefore, the Court should continue to require that the plaintiff show
that the statement made can be proven false and not hold the government responsible for the
judgments people make.
Third, the effect of holding the government responsible for any conclusions that people
draw from a list of truthful information will drastically curtail the free supply of infomiation
from the government to the public. State and Federal governments are constantly publishing
factual information. The public uses this infomiation to draw various conclusions. If the
uovemment is held responsible for these conclusions, then anytime a person could draw a
negative inference about a person, product or place, the government could be sued for violating
the Due Process Clause. One of government’s vital roles in this society is as a collector and
dispenser of information. If the government faces lawsuits for the countless lists of truthful
infonnation it publishes, the risks and costs of publishing such information will be too great.
This result will only ser\'e to deprive the public of useful information and prevent the
government from engaging in an open and free exchange of information with the public.
B.

CSORA Does Not Create a Tangible and Material State-Imposed Burden or Alter
the Legal Status of the Sex Offender.

Even if this Court finds the first prong of the Stigma plus test is satisfied, damage to a
person’s reputation alone does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Paul, 424 U.S. at 693. The Court in Paul found that an additional tangible interest, such as
employment, must be affected or there must be an alteration of a legal status before a “liberty”
interest could be found and the Due Process Clause invoked. Paul. 424 U.S. at 1161.

' Justice Brandeis referred to the states as laboratories for social experimentation. See Logan, 89
J. Crim. L. & Criminology at 1229 feiting New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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1.

CSORA Does Not Alter a Sex Offender’s Legal Status Because It Does
Not Deprive the Offender of a Right Previously Held Under State Law.

The test for when a state has altered a person’s legal status is whether the claimant is able
to show a deprivation of a right previously held. In Constantineau, the Court found that a
Wisconsin law that let a host of people declare in writing that a person was an “excessive
drinker” and then prohibited the person from purchasing alcohol for one year, violated the Due
Process Clause. 400 U.S. at 434. The Constantineau Court held, “Where a person’s good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice
and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” Id. at 437. The Paul Court found that the language
in Constantineau, “because of what the government is doing to him,” referred to the fact that the
government was doing more than just sullying the man’s reputation - it was depriving him of his
right to purchase and consume a legal product. Paul, 424 U.S. at 708. According to the Court, a
“liberty” interest was implicated in Constantineau because the government deprived an
individual “of a right previously held under state law.” Id.
CSORA does not change the sex offender’s legal status because offenders are not
deprived of any right they previously held under state law. In Paul, the Court found that no
liberty interest was implicated by the distribution and posting of flyers that labeled the
respondent an “Active Shoplifter.” Id. at 712. The respondent in Paul could not “assert denial of
any right vouchsafed to him by the State and thereby protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. Despite being labeled a shoplifter, and the possible difficulty of shopping in
stores, no liberty interest was implicated because the state took no right away from Paul. Id.
Similar to the flyer in Paul. CSORA takes no rights away from the sex offenders on the
list. CSORA places no restrictions on where sex offenders can live, on where they can travel, or
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on their employment. The sex offenders under CSORA maintain all the rights they had before
the registry was created.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found that the registration requirements of CSORA,
coupled with the possible criminal sanctions for not complying, amounted to an alteration of the
sex offender’s legal status. Dept, of Public Safety, 271 F.3d at 56.

The Second Circuit,

however, points to no right that is taken away by CSORA. Instead, it relies on the fact that the
sex offender must now comply with the registration provisions or face criminal sanctions.
In Doe V. Pryor, the court found that the Alabama Community Notification Act
implicated a liberty interest because it met the “Stigma Plus” test. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d. 1224,
1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999). The court found that the Act deprived sex offenders “of rights
previously held under State law.” ^ The Act required the plaintiff to give the government
notice before he moved, and prohibited him from living or working within 1,000 feet of a school
or childcare facility, from living with a minor who is not his biological or adoptive child and
from changing his name. Id. at 1231-32. The court held “these additional deprivations therefore
suffice to establish the ‘plus’ part of the stigma-plus test.” Id. at 1232.
CSORA is distinguishable from the statute in Pryor. The statute in Pryor not only has
registration requirements but also has additional requirements that restrict the rights of a sex
offender. Id, at 1227-28. CSORA only requires that the sex offenders register and then verify
their address by mail. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-257(c). If the sex offender decides to move, he
does not need to consult the government. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251(a), 54-252(a). He merely
needs to apprise the government of his whereabouts after he is situated. Id. CSORA does not
have any restrictions on where a sex offender can live, whom he can live with, or what he
decides to call himself. The additional requirements that the Alabama statute impose, above and
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beyond the registration requirements, all restrict rights previously held under state law. Pryor. 6l
F. Supp. 2d at 1231. CSORA is distinguishable from the Alabama statute because it does not
deprive a person of rights previously held under state law. Therefore, FO'QI should not be seen
as precedent for holding that registration burdens equal a plus factor.
In Doe v. Pataki, the court found the New York statute violated both parts of the ‘stigma
plus’ test. 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The New York statute required sex
offenders to register on a yearly basis. Id. at 468. If the offenders were classified as a sexually
violent predator” they had to personally register at the police station every 90 days. Id, If an
offender failed to register within the proscribed time he would face criminal prosecution. Id
Based on these factors, the court concluded, “There can be no genuine dispute that registration
alters the legal status of all convicted sex offenders subject to the Act.” Id, The court further
stated that sex offenders, “suffer a tangible impairment of a right in addition to mere harm to
reputation.” Id, Nevertheless, the court never defined what right had been impaired and
specifically what right the sex offender previously held under state law. Although it appears the
court applied the Paul criteria, the court never demonstrated the key component of the test, that
the statute deprived sex offenders of a right previously held under state law.
In Doe V. Williams, the District Court for the District of Columbia issued a similar
pronouncement as the court in Pataki. 167 F. Supp. 2d 45, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The court
concluded that the statute altered the sex offenders’ legal status without ever identifying a
specific right that the registry requirements restricted. Id Neither Williams nor Patakj
adequately address what an alteration of a legal status is according to Paul. Since CSORA does
not prohibit the sex offender from exercising any right previously held under state law, the
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registration requirements do not alter the sex offender’s legal status. Thus, the registration
requirements do not constitute a ‘plus’ factor.
In Cutshall v. Sundquist, the Sixth Circuit held that the Tennessee Sex Offender
Registration and Monitoring Act (“TN-SORMA”) did not deprive sex offenders of a right
previously held under state law. 193 F.3d 466, 482 (6th Cir. 1999). TN-SORMA requires that
sex offenders register within ten days of being released from prison. Id. at 470. They must also
register within ten days of moving. Id. In addition, they have to comply with the registration
and monitoring rules that may be issued by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation. Id The
Sixth Circuit looked at the rights the offender was claiming TN-SORMA restricted. Id at 479.
Cutshall claimed TN-SORMA deprived him of his right to employment and his right to privacy.
Id. The court found that TN-SORMA did not impact “Culshall’s ability to seek, obtain, and
maintain a job.” Id at 480. The court also stated that "the Constitution does not encompass a
general right to nondisclosure of private information.” Id Therefore, TN-SORMA did not
deprive Cutshall of any right that had previously been protected by the State. Id at 480-81.
Similar to Cutshall, CSORA does not deprive sex offenders of any right previously held
under state law. In the present case, the Court must determine whether the registration
requirements alter the sex offenders’ legal status. Cutshall did not address the issue of whether
regulatory requirements altered sex offenders’ legal status because the regulatory requirements
did not deprive them of a specific state right. Rather than asserting that CSORA deprived sex
offenders of a right, the Second Circuit attempted to expand the definition of altered legal status
to include regulatory requirements. Similar Cutshall, this Court should examine whether the
regulatory requirements deprive a sex offender of a right previously held under state law.
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2.

Important Policy Reasons Dictate the Need to Keep the Narrower
Definition of Altered Legal Status.

There are important policy reasons why the Court should maintain the current definition
of an altered legal status, stated in Paul, rather than the more expansive one that is put forth by
the Second Circuit. First, the Second Circuit’s reading of “altered legal status” is ambiguous.
State lawmakers will not know if the laws they are democratically elected to make are
constitutional. Under the Second Circuit’s definition, any new law could alter a person’s legal
status. No longer would there be the definition that an altered status only occurs when a person
is deprived of a right. Instead, the Court would be finding for the first time that a new
government regulation that imposes some burden on citizens violates the Due Process Clause.
Second, this ambiguity could lead to a great expansion in due process litigation because courts
would be faced with a host of new legal challenges to regulations. Third, the Second Circuit’s
standard of not identifying a right that has been deprived lends itself to judicial activism. The
‘stigma plus’ test as defined in Paul, has parameters and boundaries that limit what constitutes a
liberty interest. If this limit is removed, courts will be apt to apply judicial activism and find that
liberty interests are violated whenever they confront a due process challenge to a law they
dislike. Since almost all laws and regulations carry with them some penalty if they are not
obeyed, an activist court will always be able to find a ‘plus’ factor. Thus, the policy of limiting
the elevation of defamation suits to a constitutional claim would be negated.
This Court, as it did in Paul, should require that for there to be a plus factor the alteration
of an individual’s legal status must entail the deprivation of a right previously held. When
CSORA is analyzed under this Court’s reasoning, it is clear that it does not deprive sex offenders
of a right previously held. CSORA does not implicate any ‘liberty’ interests.
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C.

CSORA Complies With Due Process Because the Government Interest Far
Outweighs the Sex Offender's Privacy Interest.

Even if this Court holds that some liberty interest is implicated, the governmental interest
in protecting the public outweighs any minor infringement. The Court in Matthews v. Eldridge
set up a balancing test to determine what due process protections a statute might dictate. 442
U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Court set out three factors that must be balanced:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Id, In this case, the privacy interest affected by CSORA is very minor. All the information
collected on the website is a matter of public record. The risk of error is minimal. A sex
offender is placed on the list for being convicted of a sexual offense. There is no evidence in the
record that there is any significant risk of people mistakenly being labeled a convicted sex
offender. Since there is no discretion as to who is placed on the list “a hearing would serv^e no
purpose.” Lanni, 994 F. Supp. at 855.
On the other hand, the government’s interest in having a sex offender registry is great. A
primary function of government is to protect the public safety. Courts have recognized that the
state “has a compelling interest in protecting citizens” by notifying the public about convicted
sex offenders. E.B. v. Vemiero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1107 (3d Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp.
2d at 470. Providing parents the means to find out if a sex offender is living in their
neighborhood allows them to take the proper precautions to avert any possible tragedy.
Moreover, the fiscal and administrative burden’s of doing individual dangerousness
assessments for everyone on the list would be tremendous. The majority of states do not provide
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individualized risk assessment. Logan, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology at 1175. In fact, only three
states provide individualized risk assessments to all individuals who are required to register.
To require an individualized assessment would cause a great burden because the states would
have to reexamine every individual who is on their lists - often thousands of people. The states
would have to hire a different set of people to make these determinations, which w'ould cause a
great financial burden. Alternatively, the state could place the burden on a court system that is
already overloaded with its normal duties. Either option would require a great investment of
resources and create a significant additional administrative burden for the states.
In Morrissey v. Brewer, this Court found that “due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). In the
present situation, because the governmental interest is great and the sex offender’s privacy
interest is minimal, no more due process is demanded then what was already afforded to the
offender in his criminal trial.
II.

THE ALASKA SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT IS NOT AN EX POST
FACTO LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE OF ALASKA DID NOT INTEND THE STATUTE
TO BE PUNITVE, NOR IS IT PUNITIVE IN FACT.
The United States Constitution provides that no state shall pass any ex post facto law.

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10. Ex post facto laws impose “a punishment for an act which was not
punishable at the time it was committed; or ... additional punishment to that then described.”
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981). The Ex Post Facto Clause does not forbid all
legislative changes that have any conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner's punishment.
California Dept. ofCorr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 508 (1995).
Whether a statute should be classified as an ex post facto law involves a two-step inquiry,
known as the intent-effects test. U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). The Court must
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consider whether the legislature intended, either expressly or impliedly, for the statute to impose
a criminal penalty. Id, Where there is no “conclusive evidence of [legislative] intent as to the
penal nature of the statute,” the Court must determine whether the statute is penal or regulatoryin character or effect. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69(1963).
A.

The Alaska State Legislature Intended the ASORA To Be a Regulatory'. Not a
Punitive Measure.

The findings of the Alaska state legislature demonstrate their nonpunitive intent. Prior to
the enactment of ASORA, the Alaska State Legislature issued the following findings:
(1) sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending after release from custody;
(2) protecting the public from sex offenders is a primary governmental interest;
(3) the privacy interests of persons convicted of sex offenses are less important
than the government's interest in public safety; and
(4) release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the
general public will assist in protecting the public safety.
Alaska H. 69, 18lh Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (1994). The findings demonstrate that the legislature
enacted ASORA to protect the public by alerting them to sex offenders in their community.
The placement of the registration provisions of ASORA in the criminal code does not
indicate punitive intent. In Russell v. Gregoire, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that, “the overall design of the [Washington] statute’s registration provisions
indicates a regulatory, not punitive, intent.” 124 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir. 1997). The
Washington registration statute at issue in Russell, similar to the statute in this case, was located
in the criminal code. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.44.130-.140. In Doe v. Pataki, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that “Although the [Sex Offender Registration] Act is codified in
the ‘Corrections Law’ volume of the New York statutes, nothing in its text suggests that the
legislature sought to punish sex offenders for their past offenses rather than to prevent any future
harms that they might cause.” 120 F.3d 1263, 1278 (2d Cir. 1997).
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ASORA is in the code of criminal procedure because that is the practical and logical
place to locate a registration requirement dealing with convicted criminals. The code of criminal
procedure contains laws covering other, non-punitive purposes, such as laws relating to medical
examiners and actions for post-conviction relief. Doe I v. Otte, No. A94-0206-CV, slip op. at 13
(D. Alaska March 31, 1999). The legislature likely placed the registration provisions in the
criminal code because it charged the Department of Corrections with performing many of the
duties required for registration.

Alaska Stal. § 12.63.020(2002). The placement of the

registration provisions in the code of criminal procedure does not indicate a punitive intent.
Finally, the legislature placed the Department of Public Safety in charge of administering
the notification provisions. Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087. This demonstrates that the legislature
enacted the notification provisions of ASORA to protect the public, not to impose punishment on
sex offenders. Thus, the Alaska state legislature did not intend the Act to be punitive.
B.

ASORA is Not Punitive in Fact.

If the legislative intent of the statute is found to be nonpunitive, the court must then
determine whether the sanction is “so punitive” in effect as to prevent the court from legitimately
viewing the statute as regulatory or civil in nature, despite the legislature’s intent. U.S. v.
Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 316 n. 16 (1996). In determining whether the effect of the statute is so
punitive that it transforms what the legislature intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,
courts have traditionally applied the factors enumerated in Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. at 144;
Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1275; Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 477; Burrv. Snider. 234 F.3d 1052, 1054-55 (8th
Cir. 2000); Femcdeer v, Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1250-53 (10th Cir. 2000).
In Mendoza-Martinez, this Court held that “[ajbsent conclusive evidence of [legislative]
intent as to the penal nature of a statute,” courts must consider whether the sanction (1) entails an

25

affirmative disability or restraint, (2) has historically been regarded as punitive, (3) depends upon
a finding of scienter, (4) will operate to promote traditional punishment objectives, (5) applies to
behavior which is already a crime, (6) has an alternative nonpunitive purpose, and (7) is
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose. 372 U.S. at 168-69. The Court further noted that
these factors were “all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions.” ^ at
169. While this list of considerations is helpful, it is “certainly neither exhaustive nor
dispositive.” Ward, 448 U.S. at 249. Only the clearest proof suffices to override legislative
intent and transform a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 100
(1997) (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).^
1.

ASORA Does Not Create an Affirmative Disability or Restraint Because
the Registration Provisions Are Not Unduly Harsh, and Any Negative
Social Consequences Resulting From the Notification Provisions Are Due
to the Sex Offender’s Original Conviction.

The registration provisions of ASORA do not entail an affirmative disability or restraint
upon registrants. This Court has upheld statutes under Ex Post Facto Clause challenges even

^ Generally, the federal courts have found that sex offender registration statutes do not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Doe v. Pataki. 120 F.3d 1263 (Neither the registration nor
notification provisions under the New York act inflicted punishment under Ex Post Facto
Clause.); Vemiero, 119 F.3d 1077 (Notification under the New Jersey Registration and
Community Notification Laws did not constitute punishment for purposes of Ex Post Facto
Clause.); Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996) (Registrations requirements
of New Jersey statute do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.); Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional
Center, 253 F.3d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 2001) (Louisiana statute does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause even though it may have some punitive effect.); Cutshall, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999),
cert, denied, 529 U.S. 1053 (2000) (Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act
did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause.); Russell, 124 F.3d 1079 (Washington statute does not
violate Ex Post Facto Clause because it showed a regulatory, not punitive, effect.); Femedeer v.
Haun, 277 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000) (Utah’s internet notification scheme is not in violation of
the Ex Post Facto Clause.); Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174 (D. Mass. 1998) (The registration
requirements of Massachusetts law do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.); Lanni, 994 F.
Supp. 849 (The statute is not an ex post facto law because the purpose of law is to protect public,
not to punish offenders.); Chalmers v. Gavin. WL 511512 *5 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (Texas statue is
not a violation of Ex Post Facto Clause.).
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though they “may bear harshly upon one affected.” Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614
(1960). Under New York’s sex offender registration statute, offenders must register personally
every 90 days for a minimum of ten years and potentially for life. Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1284-85.
In examining the constitutionality of the New York statute, the Second Circuit held that the
burden was not so onerous as to transform an otherwise nonpunitive measure into a punitive one.
Id. at 1285. The court stated that, “The fact that the Act’s requirements are triggered by a
criminal conviction is common to all regulatory disabilities that result from prior conviction, for
instance, the loss of the right to vote.” 120 F.3d at 1280.
The registration provisions of the Alaska statute are far less onerous than the registration
provisions upheld in Pataki. Under the Alaska statute, those convicted of aggravated sexual
offenses or multiple offenses must register four times per year for life. Alaska Stat. §
12.63.020(a). Those convicted of other sex offenses must register annually for fifteen years. Id
In the opinion below, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly asserted that registrants must register in
person every ninety days. Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 984 (9th Cir. 2001). However, unlike the
New York Statute at issue in Pataki, ASORA only requires written verification of registration
information. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(d)(l)-(2). Thus, ASORA’s registration provisions do not
entail an unduly harsh affirmative disability or restraint.
This Court has upheld numerous statutes, which impose far harsher disabilities upon
defendants than ASORA. In Hudson v. U.S., this Court held that sanctions which imposed a
monetary fine coupled with lifetime debarment from employment in the banking industry did not
approach the “‘infamous punishment’ of imprisonment” and therefore did “not involve an
‘affirmative disability or restraint,’ as that term is normally understood.” 522 U.S. at 408; see
Kansas v. Hendricks. 521 U.S.346 (1967) (involuntary detainment of mentally ill not an
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affirmative disability); Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (Social Security Act provision for
termination of benefits of aliens who are deported on certain grounds not a disability); Devau v.
Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (prohibition of felons from working for waterfront unions not a
disability); Galvan v. Press. 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (deportation for prior membership in
Communist Party not a disability). Similar to Hudson, the registration requirements of ASOIUA
do not come close to approaching the “infamous punishment of imprisonment.” ASORA only
requires sex offenders to regularly mail in any changes to their registration infomiation. Alaska
Stat. § 12.63.010(d)(1),(2). Any minor inconveniences resulting from the registration provisions
of ASORA are far less burdensome than involuntary detainment, sanctions, or deportation.
Thus, the registration provisions of ASORA do not create an affirmative disability or restraint.
Registration is “typically and historically a regulatory measure.” Russell, 124 F.3d at
1089. While sex offenders are required to register regularly, the registration provisions are a
consequential and necessary aspect of a statute designed to provide the public with accurate
information about past sex offenders. The availability of this information allows the public to
make informed decisions for themselves and their families. Any disability inherent in
registration is merely consequential to this fundamental public purpose.
The notification provisions of ASORA do not entail an affirmative disability or restraint
because they are less onerous than the notification provisions upheld in other states. The
Washington sex offender registration statute at issue in Russell required the dissemination of
information to government and law enforcement agencies, schools near where the offender is
living. Block Watch captains, and local news media. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082. The Ninth
Circuit upheld the statute stating:
Notification may well subject offenders to humiliation, public opprobrium,
ostracism, and the loss of job opportunities ... But our inquiry into the law’s
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effects cannot consider the possible ‘vigilante’ or illegal responses of citizens to
notification. Such responses are expressly discouraged by the notification itself
and will be prosecuted by the stale. Indeed, courts must presume that law
enforcement will obey the law and will protect offenders from vigilantism.
Id. at 1092 (citations omitted). Unlike the Washington statute, the notification provisions of
ASORA are wholly passive. Information about sex offenders is not distributed directly to the
community or members of the media. The public must make an active effort to log onto the
website in order to view its contents. When individuals do log onto the site, they are notified of
their duty not to use the information in an illegal manner. The homepage of the site explicitly
states, “This information is made available for the purpose of protecting the public. Anyone who
uses this information to commit a criminal act against another person is subject to criminal
prosecution.” Not only is the statute less intrusive than the Washington statute upheld in Russell.
but it also provides a direct warning to anyone accessing the registry. Thus, the notifications
provisions of ASORA are less onerous that the provisions of statutes upheld in other states.
The notification provisions also do not create an affirmative disability because any social
consequences result from respondent’s original conviction. This Court recently held that in
considering whether the statute imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, the purpose and
effect of the statute must be evaluated “on its face.” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100. The purpose of
the statute, on its face, is to provide accurate information about sex offenders required to register
under ASORA.

Alaska H. 69, 18th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (1994). Any adverse social

consequences suffered by respondents are incidental to the overriding purpose of providing
accurate information in order to ensure the safety of the public.
While the notification provisions of the statute do expose respondents to “severe social
consequences which may accompany public disclosure of a registrant's offense .. .these practical
hardships, however, cannot be directly attributed to the operation of the statute itself” A.A. v.
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New Jersey, 176 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.N.J. 2001). Rather the harsh social consequences faced by
sex offenders are the result of having been convicted of a sex offense. The Second Circuit noted
in Pataki that while New York’s notification provisions may result in some unfortunate incidents,
“[t]he incidents (1) are wholly dependent on acts by private third parlies, (2) result from
information most of which was publicly available prior to SORA, and (3) flow essentially from
the fact of the underlying conviction.” 120 F.3d at 1280. Any unfortunate incidents resulting
from ASORA are dependent on acts of third parties, result from information which was already
available to the public, and flow from the underlying conviction. Any disability is not the result
of the notification provisions, but rather the result of the sex offender’s original conviction.
Finally, ASORA’s use of the internet does not entail an affirmative disability or restraint.
In Femedeer v. Haun, the Tenth Circuit held that Utah’s notification system did not create an
affirmative disability even though the information was subject to widespread notification on the
internet. 227 F.3d at 1250. In particular, the court noted that the notification system “does not
by itself prohibit sex offenders from pursuing any vocation or avocation available to other
members of the public” and therefore “does not work an affirmative disability or restraint in the
sense traditionally associated with punishment.” ]± Similarly, ASORA provides widespread
notification available over the internet. This allows for the practical dissemination of truthful,
public information. It does not impose any affirmative disability on respondents who are free to
live where they choose, come and go as they please, and seek whatever employment they may
desire.” Id, ASORA’s notification system, by making already public information available on
the internet, does not create an affirmative disability or restraint.
Neither the registration nor the notification provisions of ASORA create an affirmative
disability or restraint. The registration provisions do not create an affirmative disability because
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they do not impose unduly harsh requirements upon respondents. The notification provisions do
not impose a disability because any social consequences faced by respondents are the result of
their original conviction, not the actions of the state in making available truthful information to
the public. Thus, neither the registration nor notification provisions of ASORA create an
affirmative disability.
2.

ASORA Is Not Analogous to Any Historically Punitive Measure Because
It Does Not Impose Restrictions Such as Incarceration or Incapacitation, It
Does Not Attempt to Rehabilitate, and It Is Not Similar to the Colonial
Shaming Punishments.

Historically, punishment has taken the form of incarceration, incapacitation, or
rehabilitation. Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 475. ASORA does not impose restrictions on the conduct of
sex offenders which are akin to incarceration or incapacitation, or rehabilitation.
Furthermore, ASORA is not analogous to the historical shaming punishments. Sex
offender registration statutes are of fairly recent origin. Their general purpose has been to
protect public safety. The vast majority of courts have held that the historical analogy to the
colonial shaming punishments, such as pillory, whipping, and branding, is tenuous at best. See
Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1283 (‘‘Stigmatization penalties of an earlier era primarily served
distinctively punitive goals and operated through significantly different mechanisms than
community notification pursuant to the SORA.*‘); Vemiero, 119 F.3d at 1099-1100 (“The ‘sting’
of [New Jersey’s sex offender notification scheme] results not from their being publicly
displayed for ridicule and shaming but rather from the dissemination of accurate public record
information about their past criminal activities.”); Femedeer, 227 F.3d atl251 (“Under Utah's
law, registry information is made widely available, but it is not broadcast in a manner
approaching the historical examples of public shaming.”).
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In particular the Femedeer court noted, “Dissemination of information in and of itself.
however, has never been regarded as punishment when done in furtherance of a legitimate
governmental interest.” 227 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Vemiero, 119 F.3d at 1099-1100). The
criminal justice system insists on public indictments, public trials, and public imposition of
sentences. Id, While ASORA makes information available to the public, it does not do so in a
manner approaching the historical examples of public shaming. Public shaming required either
the holding up of the individual before fellow citizens for shaming or physical removal from the
community. Id, at 1250-51. In contrast, ASORA provides accurate, public information to the
community at large for the interests of public safety. This is exemplified not only by the
underlying purpose of the statute, but also by the notification on the website that individuals will
be subject to criminal sanctions as a result of using the information in an illegal manner.
ASORA does not impose restrictions such as incarceration or incapacitation, nor does it
attempt to rehabilitate. ASORA is not similar to the colonial shaming punishments. Thus,
ASORA is not analogous to any historically punitive measure.
3.

ASORA Is Not Imposed Only On a Finding of Scienter, Because It
Applies to Strict Liability Crimes.

Neither ASORA itself, nor the underlying offenses to which it applies are based only on a
finding of scienter. Statutes conditioned upon a finding of scienter are traditionally more likely
to be considered criminal rather than civil in nature. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. The
inquiry in regard to this factor concerns whether the ASORA’s requirements may be imposed
only on a finding of scienter. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104. All convicted sex offenders are required
to register under the statute. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010. No finding of scienter is required in order
for ASORA to apply to such offenders. Id In addition, the underlying offenses to which
ASORA applies are not conditioned only on a finding of scienter because ASORA applies to
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‘‘strict liability” crimes as well as crimes conditioned on a finding of scienter. Alaska Stat. §
12.63.100(1)(C). Thus, neither the statute itself, nor the sex offenses to which it applies are
based only on a finding of scienter.
4.

The Sole Purpose of ASORA Is Neither to Serve as a Deterrent Nor
Retributive Measure Because It Is a Regulatory Statute Designed to
Provide Reliable Information to the Public About Convicted Sex
Offenders.

The sole purpose of ASORA is not to serve the traditional aims of punishment:
deterrence and retribution. A sanction's deterrent effect does not mean that it must be classified
as criminal. As this Court has noted, “though statutes may fairly be said to ser\'e the purpose of
deterrence, we long have held that this purpose may serve civil as well as criminal goals.”
Ursery, 518 U.S. at 292. While ASORA may have a consequential deterrent effect, its primary
purpose is to notify the public. As the Second Circuit held in Pataki, “even if the SORA
advances some goals traditionally associated with the criminal law, it primarily serves important
nonpunitive goals of protecting the public from potential dangers and facilitating future law
enforcement efforts.” Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1283 (quoting Urserv.518 U.S. at 289).
In Hendricks, this Court held that an act which allowed for involuntary confinement of
mentally ill individuals was “not retributive because it [did] not affix culpability for prior
criminal conduct.” 521 U.S. at 362. The Court further noted that the purpose of the Act was not
to punish past misdeeds, but to predict future behavior. Id Similarly, ASORA does not affix
culpability for prior criminal conduct, nor does it attempt to punish past misdeeds. The purpose
of the statute is to notify the public in order to give them the opportunity to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking and protect themselves and their children
Under ASORA, the registration period is “tolled for each year that a sex offender or child
kidnapper fails to [register].” Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(A)(2). The tolling nature of the statute
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does not indicate a punitive effect. Tolling is designed to prevent offenders from avoiding their
duty to register, not to punish them for past criminal conduct. Thus, the sole purpose of ASORA
is not to serve the traditional aims of punishment, but rather to provide accurate information to
the public about convicted sex offenders.
5.

While a Criminal Conviction Does Trigger ASORA, This Factor Should
Be Accorded Little Weight Due to the Strong Connection Between
ASORA’s Registration and Notification Requirements and a Legitimate
Civil Purpose.

While the requirements of ASORA are triggered by a criminal conviction, this factor
should be accorded little weight. In Ward, this Court noted that a statute triggered by a criminal
conviction may indicate that the sanction itself is criminal in nature. 448 U.S. at 250. The
Court, however, declined to put significant emphasis on this factor since, “Congress may impose
both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission.” Id. (citations
omitted). Alaska has sought to use the sex offender registry to aid in the prevention and
investigation of future sex offenses. Thus, this factor should be accorded little weight because
there is a legitimate civil purpose in triggering the statute by the conviction of a sex offense.
Individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity or incompetent to stand trial do not
have to register under the statute. These individuals are generally civilly committed. They pose
no danger to the public. The fact that they are not required to register does not demonstrate that
ASORA is punitive.
Finally, although ASORA punishes a sex offender’s failure to register, this provision of
the statute applies to future, not past, conduct. Alaska St. 11.56.835-.840. In Russell, the Ninth
Circuit held that “no ex post facto problem occurs when the legislature creates a new offense that
includes a prior conviction as an element of the offense, as long as the other relevant conduct
took place after the law was passed.” 124 F.3d at 1089. Sex offenders are notified of their duty
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to register prior to their release from incarceration. If they fail to register, they may face criminal
penalties. The statute penalizes future conduct - failure to register - not past criminal activity.
6.

ASORA Has a Significant Nonpunitive Alternative Purpose: To Provide
Accurate, Public Information About Convicted Sex Offenders.

The purpose of ASORA is to inform the public of accurate information. Respondents
have conceded that there is a rational nonpunitive purpose that can be connected to ASORA.
The existence of a nonpunitive purpose for ASORA, protecting the public by giving them
accurate, public information, provides strong support for the fact that ASORA is not punitive.
The legislature enacted ASORA due to the high number of sex offenders in Alaska and the
extremely high rate of recidivism among such offenders. ASORA aids in the prevention and
investigation of future sex crimes. By requiring sex offenders to register, law enforcement can
track sex offenders and discover their whereabouts when they do re-offend. It also allows the
public to protect themselves and their families from future incidents of sex crimes committed by
past offenders. The fact that ASORA provides law enforcement with a valuable source of
information and protects the public from future offenders demonstrates that the statute has an
overriding nonpunitive purpose.
7.

ASORA’s Registration and Notification Provisions Are Necessary
Measures Designed to Provide Reliable Information to the Public About
Convicted Sex Offenders.

ASORA is not excessive in relation to its alternative purpose. While the Ninth Circuit
incorrectly asserted that respondents must register in person every 90 days, this is inaccurate and
untrue. Otte, 259 F.3d at 987. Under the statute, sex offenders are only required to send in a
written verification in annually. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(d)(1). Persons required to register for
life must send a written verification in quarterly. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(d)(2). Since the
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registration provisions require only written verification, not registry in person, ASORA is not
excessive in relation to its alternative purpose.
The purpose behind ASORA is to provide accurate information to the public in order for
them to make an informed decision about protecting themselves and their families. In order to
promote this need, the legislature provided for a central registry, accessible via the internet. The
internet is a logical, practical place to provide information to the public. It is less intrusive than
mailing notifications to individuals, or taking other affirmative measures in order to inform the
public of such information. For example, under Washington’s statute, “notification forms are
provided to government and law enforcement agencies, to schools within the federal census tract
where the offender is living, and to Block Watch Captains . .. [and] local news media." Russell,
124 F.3d at 1083. The internet is passive and allows the public to seek out the information
provided in a central registry. While the information is available to a widespread group of
people, the farther removed one is from the sex offender’s community, the less likely one will be
to have an interest in accessing their particular registry. As the Femedeer court noted, “To a
large extent, therefore, the dangers resulting from widespread dissemination are negated by the
decreasing likelihood that the information will actually be obtained." 227 F.3d at 1253. The
court further noted that “the considerable assistance Internet notification will offer in the
prevention, avoidance and investigation of these serious and damaging crimes justifies the means
employed.” Id Similarly, the Pataki court noted, “The legislature is not required to act with
perfect precision, and its decision to cast a net wider than what might be absolutely necessary
does not transform an otherwise regulatory measure into a punitive sanction.

120 F.3d at 1282.

Thus, the mere presence of the registry on the internet does not justify a finding that ASORA is
excessive in relation to its alternative purpose.
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Alaska’s choice not to incorporate a risk-assessment into its notification scheme does not
make the statute punitive. Other states have chosen to incorporate a “risk-assessment into their
notification scheme.

Patajri, 120 F.3d at 1285; Vemiero, 119 F.3d at 1111; Russell, 124 F.3d

at 1082. While these systems may provide a general indication of the level of danger of the sex
offender to the public, they are based on an assessment by the state. In contrast, ASORA
provides the public specific information, including the sex crimes committed by the given
individual. This allows individuals using the site to make their own assessment about each sex
offender’s potential for recidivism based on the previous crimes they have committed.
C.

Examined Alone, Neither the Registration Nor the Notification Provisions of
ASORA Violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.

Courts generally examine the registration and notification requirements separately in
order to determine whether the statute is punitive.

Pataki, 120 F.3d 123 (examining

registration and notification provisions separately); Russell, 124 F.3d 1079 (using a separate
analysis for registration and notification provisions of Washington’s SORA); Femedeer, 227
F.3d 1244 (examining only the notification provisions of Utah’s SORA). In this case, the Ninth
Circuit was able to find that ASORA was an ex post facto law only by examining the registration
and notification provisions together. This allowed the court to look to either the registration or
notification provisions of ASORA in order to fulfill the seven factors in the Mendoza-Martinez
test. Had the Ninth Circuit looked at the registration and notification provisions separately, the
court would have found that ASORA was not an ex post facto law.
The registration provisions, standing alone, do not come close to fulfilling the MendozaMartinez factors. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Russell, “registration provisions have
overwhelmingly been sustained as constitutional by other courts.” 124 F.3d at 1088 (citations
omitted). In addition, the notification provisions, standing alone, do not support a finding that
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the statute is punitive. As the Femedeer court noted, “In total only the fifth [Mendoza-Martinez]
factor even somewhat suggests that the Internet notification scheme constitutes criminal
punishment. The equivocal support of this factor, however, does not come even close to the
‘clearest proof necessary to overcome the civil intent of Utah’s legislature." 227 F.3d at 1253.
Examining the Mendoza-Martinez factors on balance. Respondents have not
demonstrated by the “clearest proof’ that ASORA is punitive in fact. The mere presence of a
single factor falling in Respondent’s favor is not a sufficient basis to transform ASORA from a
regulatory into a punitive statute. Rather, only the “clearest proof’ will suffice. Respondents
have clearly not met this standard with respect to either the registration or notification provisions
of the statute. No single factor falls in respondents favor. Furthermore, the two most important
factors in regard to sex offender registration statutes, affirmative disability and restraint and
alternative purpose, demonstrate ASORA’s nonpunitive purpose. No court has found a law to be
an ex post facto law without also finding that it imposed some affirmative disability or restraint.
ASORA does not impose an unduly harsh affirmative disability or restraint. Furthermore, in the
context of sex offender registration acts, the alternative purpose of the statute should bear
significantly on a court’s decision. In this case, ASORA has a significant nonpunitive alternative
purpose because it serves to protect the public from future sex crimes. For these reasons,
ASORA was both intended to be a regulatory measure and is not punitive in fact.
CONCLUSION
CSORA provides true information to the public. It does not falsely stigmatize sex
offenders as dangerous. CSORA does not alter the legal status of sex offenders because it does
not take away any right that they previously held. Therefore, CSORA does not impinge on a sex
offender’s liberty interest and does not implicate the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
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Due Process Clause. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court
REVERSE the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the due
process claim and uphold CSORA so that state governments can continue to provide the public
with useful, true information.
The legislature did not intend ASORA to be punitive, nor is it punitive in fact. Therefore,
ASORA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. For the
foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court REVERSE the judgment of the
United Slates Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the ex post facto claim and uphold
ASORA so that the state of Alaska can continue to provide law enforcement and the public with
useful information about convicted sex offenders.
Respectfully submitted,

Jeffrey^M. Kaban
..
'/
'- -'- i L "------------Robert J. Nolan
'

Counsel for Petitioners
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APPENDIX A: THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides:
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities or citizens
of the United Stales; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

APPENDIX B: THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution
Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a
Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder; ex post facto Law; or Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts; or grant any Title of Nobility.

APPENDIX C: CONNECTICUT SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT

Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act
The Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act provides, in relevant part:
§ 54*250. Definitions.
For the purposes of sections 54-102g and 54-250 to 54-259, inclusive:
(1) "Conviction" means a judgment entered by a court upon a plea of guilty, a plea of nolo
contendere or a finding of guilty by a jury or the court notwithstanding any pending appeal or
habeas corpus proceeding arising from such judgment.
(2) "Criminal offense against a victim who is a minor" means (A) a violation of subdivision
(2) of section 53-21, subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-70, subdivision (1), (4) or
(8) of subsection (a) of section 53a-71, subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-72a,
subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-86, subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section
53a-87, section 53a-196a, 53a-196b, 53a-196c or 53a-196d, (B) a violation of section 53a-92,
53a-92a, 53a-94, 53a-94a, 53a-95, 53a-96 or 53a-186, provided the court makes a finding that, at
the time of the offense, the victim was under eighteen years of age, (C) a violation of any of the
offenses specified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of this subdivision for which a person is criminally
liable under section 53a-8, 53a-48 or 53a-49, or (D) a violation of any predecessor statute to any
offense specified in subparagraph (A), (B) or (C) of this subdivision the essential elements of
which are substantially the same as said offense.
(3) "Identifying factors" means fingerprints, a photographic image, and a description of any
other identifying characteristics as may be required by the Commissioner of Public Safety. The
commissioner shall also require a sample of the registrant’s blood taken for DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis, unless such sample has been previously obtained in accordance
with section 54-102g.
(4) "Mental abnormality" means a congenital or acquired condition of a person that affects
the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes that person to the
commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to the health and
safety of other persons.
(5) "Nonviolent sexual offense" means a violation of section 53a-73a.
(6) "Not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect" means a finding by a court or jury of
not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13 notwithstanding any
pending appeal or habeas corpus proceeding arising from such finding.
(7) "Personality disorder" means a condition as defined in the most recent edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric
Association.
(8) "Registrant" means a person required to register under section 54-251, 54-252, 54-253 or
54-254.
(9) "Registry" means a central record system in this state, any other state or the federal
government that receives, maintains and disseminates information on persons convicted or found
not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of criminal offenses against victims who are

minors, nonviolent sexual offenses, sexually violent offenses and felonies found by the
sentencing court to have been committed for a sexual purpose.
(10) "Release into the community" means, with respect to a conviction or a finding of not
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of a criminal offense against a victim who is a
minor, a nonviolent sexual offense, a sexually violent offense or a felony found by the
sentencing court to have been committed for a sexual purpose, (A) any release by a court after
such conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, a sentence of
probation or any other sentence under section 53a-28 that does not result in the offender's
immediate placement in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction; (B) release from a
correctional facility at the discretion of the Board of Parole, by the Department of Correction to a
program authorized by section 18-100c or upon completion of the maximum term or terms of the
offender’s sentence or sentences, or to the supervision of the Office of Adult Probation in
accordance with the terms of the offender's sentence; or (C) release from a hospital for mental
illness or a facility for persons with mental retardation by the Psychiatric Security Review Board
on conditional release pursuant to section 17a-588 or upon termination of commitment to the
Psychiatric Security Review Board.
(11) "Sexually violent offense" means (A) a violation of section 53a-70, except subdivision
(2) of subsection (a) of said section, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, except subdivision (1), (4) or (8)
of subsection (a) of said section, 53a-72a, except subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of said section,
or 53a-72b. or of section 53a-92 or 53a-92a, provided the court makes a finding that the offense
was committed with intent to sexually violate or abuse the victim, (B) a violation of any of the
offenses specified in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision for which a person is criminally liable
under section 53a-8, 53a-48 or 53a-49, or (C) a violation of any predecessor statute to any of the
offenses specified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of this subdivision the essential elements of which
are substantially the same as said offense.
(12) "Sexual purpose" means that a purpose of the defendant in committing the felony was to
engage in sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without that person's consent.
A sexual purpose need not be the sole purpose of the commission of the felony. The sexual
purpose may arise at any time in the course of the commission of the felony.
§ 54-251. Registration of person who has committed a criminal offense against a victim
who is a minor or a nonviolent sexual offense.
(a) Any person who has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or
defect of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor or a nonviolent sexual offense, and is
released into the community on or after October 1, 1998, shall, within three days following such
release, and whether or not such person's place of residence is in this state, register such person’s
name, identifying factors, criminal history record and residence address with the Commissioner
of Public Safety, on such forms and in such locations as the commissioner shall direct, and shall
maintain such registration for ten years except that any person who has one or more prior
convictions of any such offense or who is convicted of a violation of subdivision (2) of
subsection (a) of section 53a-70 shall maintain such registration for life. Prior to accepting a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere from a person with respect to a criminal offense against a victim
who is a minor or a nonviolent sexual offense, the court shall (1) inform the person that the entry

of a finding of guilty after acceptance of the plea will subject the person to the registration
requirements of this section, and (2) determine that the person fully understands the
consequences of the plea. If such person changes such person's address such person shall, within
five days, register the new address in writing with the Commissioner of Public Safety, and, if the
new address is in another state, such person shall also register with an appropriate agency in that
state, provided that state has a registration requirement for such offenders. If any person who is
subject to registration under this section regularly travels into or within another state or
temporarily resides in another state for purposes including, but not limited to employment or
schooling, such person shall notify the Commissioner of Public Safety and shall also register
with an appropriate agency in that state provided that state has a registration requirement for
such offenders. During such period of registration, each registrant shall complete and return
fomis mailed to such registrant to verify such registrant's residence address and shall submit to
the retaking of a photographic image upon request of the Commissioner of Public Safety.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, the court may exempt
any person who has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of a
violation of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-71 from the registration requirements
of this section if the court finds that such person was under nineteen years of age at the time of
the offense and that registration is not required for public safety.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, the court may exempt
any person who has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of a
violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-73a from the registration
requirements of this section if the court finds that registration is not required for public safety.
(d) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony.
§ 54-252. Registration of person who has committed a sexually violent offense.
(a) Any person who has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or
defect of a sexually violent offense, and (1) is released into the community on or after October 1,
1988, and prior to October 1,1998, and resides in this state, shall, on October 1,1998, or within
three days of residing in this state, whichever is later, or (2) is released into the community on or
after October 1, 1998, shall, within three days following such release, register such person's
name, identifying factors, criminal history record, documentation of any treatment received for
mental abnormality or personality disorder, and residence address with the Commissioner of
Public Safety on such forms and in such locations as said commissioner shall direct, and shall
maintain such registration for life. Prior to accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from a
person with respect to a sexually violent offense, the court shall (A) inform the person that the
entry of a finding of guilty after acceptance of the plea will subject the person to the registration
requirements of this section, and (B) determine that the person fully understands the
consequences of the plea. If such person changes such person's address such person shall, within
five days, register the new address in writing with the Commissioner of Public Safety, and, if the
new address is in another state, such person shall also register with an appropriate agency in that
state, provided that state has a registration requirement for such offenders. If any person who is
subject to registration under this section regularly travels into or within another state or
temporarily resides in another state for purposes including, but not limited to employment or

schooling, such person shall notify the Commissioner of Public Safety and shall also register
with an appropriate agency in that state, provided that state has a registration requirement for
such offenders. During such period of registration, each registrant shall complete and return
forms mailed to such registrant to verify such registrant's residence address and shall submit to
the retaking of a photographic image upon request of the Commissioner of Public Safety.
(b) Any person who has been subject to the registration requirements of section 54-I02r of
the general statutes, revised to January 1, 1997, as amended by section 1 of public act 97-183,
shall, not later than three working days after October 1, 1998, register under this section and
thereafter comply with the provisions of sections 54-102g and 54-250 to 54-259, inclusive.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, during the initial
registration period following October 1, 1998, the Commissioner of Public Safety may phase in
completion of the registration procedure for persons released into the community prior to said
date over the first three months following said date, and no such person shall be prosecuted for
failure to register under this section during those three months provided such person complies
with the directives of said commissioner regarding registration procedures.
(d) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony.
§ 54-253. Registration of person who has committed a sexual offense in another
jurisdiction.
(a) Any person who has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or
defect in any other state, in a federal or military court or in any foreign jurisdiction of any crime,
the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes specified in
subdivisions (2), (5) and (11) of section 54-250 and who resides in this state on and after October
1, 1998, shall, within ten days of residing in this state, register with the Commissioner of Public
Safety in the same manner as if such person had been convicted or found not guilty by reason of
mental disease or defect of such crime in this state, except that for purposes of determining the
ten-year period of registration under section 54-251 such person shall be deemed to have initially
registered on the date of such person’s release into the community in such other stale, federal or
military system or foreign jurisdiction.
(b) Any person not a resident of this state w'ho is registered as a sexual offender under the
laws of any other state and who regularly travels into or within this state or temporarily resides in
this state for purposes including, but not limited to employment or schooling shall, within three
days after the commencement of such travel or residence in this state, register such person’s
name, identifying factors, criminal history record, locations visited on a recurring basis or
residence address, if any, in this state, and residence address in such person's home state with the
Commissioner of Public Safety on such forms and in such locations as said commissioner shall
direct and shall maintain such registration until such travel or residence terminates or until such
person is released from registration as a sexual offender in such other state. If such person
terminates such person's travel or residence in this state or changes such person's address in this
state such person shall, within five days, provide notice in writing to the Commissioner of Public
Safety.
(c) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony.

§ 54-254. Registration of person who has committed a felony for a sexual purpose.
(a) Any person who has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or
defect in this state on or after October 1, 1998, of any felony that the court finds was committed
for a sexual purpose, may be required by the court upon release into the community to register
such person's name, identifying factors, criminal history record and residence address with the
Commissioner of Public Safety, on such forms and in such locations as the commissioner shall
direct, and to maintain such registration for ten years. If the court finds that a person has
committed a felony for a sexual purpose and intends to require such person to register under this
section, prior to accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from such person with respect to
such felony, the court shall (1) inform the person that the entry of a finding of guilty after
acceptance of the plea will subject the person to the registration requirements of this section, and
(2) determine that the person fully understands the consequences of the plea. If such person
changes such person’s address such person shall, within five days, register the new address in
writing with the Commissioner of Public Safety, and, if the new address is in another state, such
person shall also register with an appropriate agency in that state, provided that state has a
registration requirement for such offenders. If any person who is subject to registration under this
section regularly travels into or within another state or temporarily resides in another state for
purposes including, but not limited to employment or schooling, such person shall notify the
Commissioner of Public Safety and shall also register with an appropriate agency in that state,
provided that state has a registration requirement for such offenders. During such period of
registration, each registrant shall complete and return forms mailed to such registrant to verify
such registrant's residence address and shall submit to the retaking of a photographic image upon
request of the Commissioner of Public Safety.
(b) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony.
§ 54-255. Restriction on dissemination of registration information for certain offenders.
(a) Upon the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of any
person for a violation of section 53a-70b, the court may order the Department of Public Safety to
restrict the dissemination of the registration information to law enforcement purposes only and to
not make such information available for public access, provided the court finds that
dissemination of the registration information is not required for public safety and that publication
of the registration information would be likely to reveal the identity of the victim within the
community where the victim resides. The court shall remove the restriction on the dissemination
of such registration information if, at any time, the court finds that public safety requires that
such person’s registration information be made available to the public or that a change of
circumstances makes publication of such registration information no longer likely to reveal the
identity of the victim within the community where the victim resides. Prior to ordering or
removing the restriction on the dissemination of such person's registration information, the court
shall consider any information or statements provided by the victim.

(b) Upon the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of any
person of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor, a nonviolent sexual offense or a
sexually violent offense, where the victim of such offense was, at the time of the offense, under
eighteen years of age and related to such person within any of the degrees of kindred specified in
section 46b-21, the court may order the Department of Public Safety to restrict the dissemination
of the registration information to law enforcement purposes only and to not make such
information available for public access, provided the court finds that dissemination of the
registration information is not required for public safety and that publication of the registration
information would be likely to reveal the identity of the victim within the community where the
victim resides. The court shall remove the restriction on the dissemination of such registration
information if, at any time, it finds that public safety requires that such person's registration
information be made available to the public or that a change in circumstances makes publication
of the registration information no longer likely to reveal the identity of the victim within the
community where the victim resides.
§ 54-256. Responsibilities of courts and agencies in registration process.
Any court, the Commissioner of Correction or the Psychiatric Security Review Board, prior to
releasing into the community any person convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental
disease or defect of a criminal ofiense against a victim who is a minor, a nonviolent sexual
offense, a sexually violent offense or a felony found by the sentencing court to have been
committed for a sexual purpose, except a person being released unconditionally at the conclusion
of such person’s sentence or commitment, shall require as a condition of such release that such
person complete the registration procedure established by the Commissioner of Public Safety
under sections 54-251, 54-252 and 54-254. The court, the Commissioner of Correction or the
Psychiatric Security Review Board, as the case may be, shall provide the person with a written
summary of the person's obligations under sections 54-102g and 54-250 to 54-259, inclusive, and
transmit the completed registration package to the Commissioner of Public Safety who shall
enter the information into the registry established under section 54-257. If a court transmits the
completed registration package to the Commissioner of Public Safety with respect to a person
released by the court, such package need not include identifying factors for such person. In the
case of a person being released unconditionally who declines to complete the registration
package through the court or the releasing agency, the court or agency shall: (1) Except with
respect to information that is not available to the public pursuant to court order, rule of court or
any provision of the general statutes, provide to the Commissioner of Public Safety the person's
name, date of release into the community, anticipated residence address, if known, criminal
history record, any known treatment history and any other relevant information; (2) inform the
person that such person has an obligation to register within three days with the Commissioner of
Public Safety for a period of ten years following the dale of such person's release or for life, as
the case may be, and that if such person changes such person's address such person shall within
five days register the new address in writing with the Commissioner of Public Safety and, if the
new address is in another state or if such person regularly travels into or within another state or
temporarily resides in another state for purposes including, but not limited to employment or
schooling, such person shall also register with an appropriate agency in that state, provided that
state has a registration requirement for such offenders; P) provide the person with a written
summary of the person's obligations under sections 54-102g and 54-250 to 54-259, inclusive, as

explained to the person under subdivision (2) of this section; and (4) make a specific notation on
the record maintained by that agency with respect to such person that the registration
requirements were explained to such person and that such person was provided with a written
summary of such person's obligations under sections 54-102g and 54-250 to 54-259, inclusive.
§ 54-257. Registr>'. Suspension of registration. Verification of address.
(a) The Department of Public Safety shall, not later than January 1, 1999, establish and
maintain a registry of all persons required to register under sections 54-251,54-252, 54-253 and
54-254. The department shall, in cooperation with the Office of the Chief Court Administrator,
the Department of Correction and the Psychiatric Security Review Board, develop appropriate
forms for use by agencies and individuals to report registration information, including changes of
address. Upon receipt of registration information, the department shall enter the information into
the registry and notify the local police department or state police troop having jurisdiction where
the registrant resides or plans to reside. If a registrant reports a residence in another state, the
department shall notify the state police agency of that state or such other agency in that state that
maintains registry information, if known. The department shall also transmit all registration
information, conviction data, photographic images and fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in such form as said bureau shall require for inclusion in a national registry.
(b) The Department of Public Safety may suspend the registration of any person registered
under section 54-251, 54-252, 54-253 or 54-254 while such person is incarcerated, under civil
commitment or residing outside this state. During the period that such registration is under
suspension, the department is not required to verify the address of the registrant pursuant to
subsection (c) of this section and may withdraw the registration information from public access.
Upon the release of the registrant from incarceration or civil commitment or resumption of
residency in this state by the registrant, the department shall reinstate the registration, redistribute
the registration information in accordance with subsection (a) of this section and resume
verifying the address of the registrant in accordance with subsection (c) of this section.
Suspension of registration shall not affect the date of expiration of the registration obligation of
the registrant under section 54-251, 54-252 or 54-253.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the Department of Public Safety shall
verify the address of each registrant by mailing a nonforwardable verification form to the
registrant at the registrant's last reported address. Such form shall require the registrant to sign a
statement that the registrant continues to reside at the registrant’s last reported address and return
the form by mail by a date which is ten days after the date such form was mailed to the
registrant. The form shall contain a statement that failure to return the form or providing false
information is a violation of section 54-251, 54-252, 54-253 or 54-254, as the case may be. Each
person required to register under section 54-251 or 54-254 shall have such person’s address
verified in such manner armually on the anniversary of such person's initial registration date.
Each person required to register under section 54-252 shall have such person's address verified in
such manner every ninety days after such person's initial registration dale. Each person required
to register under section 54-253 shall have such person's address verified in such manner either
annually on the anniversary of such person’s initial registration date or every ninety days after
such person’s initial registration date depending upon whether, after such initial registration, such
person is subject to the requirements of section 54-251 or section 54-252, respectively. In the
event that a registrant fails to return the address verification form, the Department of Public

Safety shall notify the local police department or the state police troop having jurisdiction over
the registrant's last reported address, and that agency shall apply for a warrant to be issued for the
registrant's arrest under section 54-251, 54-252, 54-253 or 54-254, as the case may be. The
Department of Public Safety shall not verify the address of registrants whose last reported
address was outside this state.
(d) The Department of Public Safety shall retake the photographic image of each registrant at
least once every five years.
§ 54-258. Availability of registration information. Immunity.
(a)( 1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the general statutes, except subdivisions (3) and
(4) of this subsection, the registry maintained by the Department of Public Safety shall be a
public record and shall be accessible to the public during normal business hours. The Department
of Public Safety shall make registry information available to the public through the Internet. Not
less than once per calendar quarter, the Department of Public Safety shall issue notices to all
print and electronic media in the stale regarding the availability and means of accessing the
registry. Each local police department and each state police troop shall keep a record of all
registration information transmitted to it by the Department of Public Safety, and shall make
such information accessible to the public during normal business hours.
(2) Any stale agency, the Judicial Department, any state police troop or any local police
department may, at its discretion, notify any government agency, private organization or
individual of registration infomiation when such agency, said department, such troop or such
local police department, as the case may be, believes such notification is necessary to protect the
public or any individual in any jurisdiction from any person who is subject to registration under
section 54-251, 54-252, 54-253 or 54-254.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection, state
agencies, the Judicial Department, state police troops and local police departments shall not
disclose the identity of any victim of a crime committed by a registrant or treatment information
provided to the registry pursuant to sections 54-102g and 54-250 to 54-259, inclusive, except to
government agencies for bona fide law enforcement or security purposes.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection, registration
information the dissemination of which has been restricted by court order pursuant to section 54255 and which is not otherwise subject to disclosure, shall not be a public record and shall be
released only for law enforcement purposes until such restriction is removed by the court
pursuant to said section.
(5) When any registrant completes the registrant's term of registration or is otherwise
released from the obligation to register under section 54-251, 54-252, 54-253 or 54-254, the
Department of Public Safety shall notify any state police troop or local police department having
jurisdiction over the registrant's last reported residence address that the person is no longer a
registrant, and the Department of Public Safety, state police troop and local police department
shall remove the registrant's name and information from the registry.
(b) Neither the slate nor any political subdivision of the state nor any officer or employee
thereof, shall be held civilly liable to any registrant by reason of disclosure of any information

regarding the registrant that is released or disclosed in accordance with subsection (a) of this
section. The state and any political subdivision of the state and, except in cases of wanton,
reckless or malicious conduct, any officer or employee thereof, shall be immune from liability
for good faith conduct in carrying out the provisions of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this
section.
§ 54-258a. Warning against wrongful use of registrj’ information.
Any agency of the state or any political subdivision thereof that provides public access to
information contained in the registry shall post a warning that states: "Any person who uses
information in this registry to injure, harass or commit a criminal act against any person included
in the registry or any other person is subject to criminal prosecution." Such warning shall be in a
suitable size and location to ensure that it will be seen by any person accessing registry
information.
§ 54-259. Sexual Offender Registration Committee.
(a) There is established a Sexual Offender Registration Committee consisting of the following
members or their designees: The Chief Court Administrator, the Chief State’s Attorney, the
Commissioner of Public Safety, the Commissioner of Correction, the Secretary of the Office of
Policy and Management, the chairman of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, the chairman
of the Board of Parole, the director of the Office of Adult Probation, the President of the
Connecticut Police Chiefs Association and two persons appointed by the Governor, one of whom
shall be involved in the delivery of services to victims of sexual assault and one of whom shall
be involved in the delivery of services to victims of crime. The Chief Court Administrator shall
serv'e as chairperson of the committee. The Office of Policy and Management shall, within
available resources, provide staff resources to the committee.
(b) On or before January 15, 1999, the Sexual Offender Registration Committee shall submit
a report to the Governor and the General Assembly. Such report shall make recommendations
concerning the implementation of sections 54-102g and 54-250 to 54-259, inclusive, and shall
address issues including (1) assuring interagency coordination to maximize the accuracy and
timeliness of information contained in the registry, (2) complying with other applicable state and
federal laws and regulations, (3) establishing a procedure by which registrants may apply to the
sentencing court, not sooner than ten years after initial registration, to be relieved of their
obligation to register, (4) establishing a board of experts in the behavior and treatment of sexual
offenders, to examine such applicants and make recommendations to the court in accordance
with section 54-255, (5) developing guidelines for the slate police and municipal police
departments that shall set forth the circumstances in which individuals, private organizations and
government agencies in their respective jurisdictions should be directly notified that a person
subject to registration under sections 54-102g and 54-250 to 54-259, inclusive, is residing near
their locations, and (6) any other fiscal, legislative and programmatic matters which affect the
successful implementation of the registry.
§ 54-260. (Formerly Sec. 54-102s). Notification of change of address of sexual offenders on
parole or probation.

(a) For the purposes of this section, "sexual offender" means any person convicted of a
violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21, section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a
or 53a-72b committed on or after October 1, 1995.
(b) Any sexual offender who is released from a correctional institution on parole or who is
sentenced to a period of probation shall, during the period of such parole or probation and as a
condition of such parole or probation, immediately notify his parole officer or probation officer,
as the case may be, whenever he changes his residence address. Each parole officer or probation
officer who is notified of such change of address shall notify the chief of police of the police
department or resident state trooper for the municipality of the new address of the parolee or
probationer and any other law enforcement official he deems appropriate.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a parole officer or probation officer
acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment from disclosing
any information concerning the parolee or probationer to any person whenever he deems such
disclosure to be appropriate.
§ 54-261. Community response education program.
(a) The Office of Adult Probation, in conjunction with state-wide experts in law enforcement,
the treatment of sexual offenders and sexual assault victim services, shall, within available
appropriations, develop a community response education program to be offered to
neighborhoods and municipalities that have been notified pursuant to section 54-258 that a
person who has registered under said section is or will be residing in that community.
(b) The purpose of such program shall be to assist neighborhoods, parents and children to
learn how to better protect themselves from sexual abuse and sexual assault. The program shall
develop educational materials and community information resources on prevention and risk
reduction concerning sexual abuse and sexual assault and the enforcement of requirements
concerning the registration and supervision of sexual offenders and the notification of
communities where such offenders reside.
(c) The program may include the following:
(1) An initial community meeting following a community notification, sponsored by the
Office of Adult Probation and held in conjunction with the chief of police, chief elected officials,
the superintendent of schools and other municipal officials of the community, to discuss the
implementation of the statutory requirements concerning the registration of a sexual offender and
the notification of the community where such offender resides, to provide information on the
crime or crimes involved and to provide information on how the offender will be monitored by
the Office of Adult Probation and the specific conditions of probation applicable to the offender;
(2) Information on how and where concerned residents may report observed violations by an
offender of the conditions of such offender's probation;
(3) Resources to educate families and children in the prevention and avoidance of sexual
abuse and sexual assault and for parents seeking supportive methods for discussing relevant
issues with their children;

(4) Resources on when and how a community may wish to establish a network of "Safe
Houses" for neighborhood children to use when they seek safe shelter or the creation of a
neighborhood block watch or crime watch;
(5) Resources for police depanments and boards of education to use in consulting with
parents on appropriate school-based classroom programs stressing safety, prevention and risk
reduction and to use in developing educational programs for parents to discuss relevant issues
with their children;
(6) Compilation and distribution of a list of child protective agencies, child guidance clinics
and rape crisis centers for families seeking more in-depth counseling after a community
notification has occurred.
(d) The Office of Adult Probation may apply for and receive grants from the federal
government or any agency thereof or from any foundation, corporation, association or individual
for purposes of the development of the community response education program under this
section.

APPENDIX D: ALASKA SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT

Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act

The Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act provides, in relevant part:
§ 11.56.835 Failure to register as a sex offender or child kidnapper in the first degree.

(a) A person commits the crime of failure to register as a sex offender or child kidnapper in the
first degree if the person violates AS 11.56.840
(1) and the person has been previously convicted of a crime under this section or AS 11.56.840
or a law or ordinance of this or another jurisdiction with elements similar to a crime under this
section or AS 11.56.840; or
(2) with intent to escape detection or identification and, by escaping detection or identification,
to facilitate the person's commission of a sex offense or child kidnapping.
(b) In a prosecution under (a)(2) of this section, the fact that the defendant, for a period of at
least one year, failed to register as a sex offender or child kidnapper, failed to file the annual or
quarterly written verification or changed the sex offender's or child kidnapper's address and did
not file the required notice of change of address, is prima facie evidence that the defendant
intended to escape detection or identification and, by escaping detection or identification, to
facilitate the person's commission of a sex offense or child kidnapping.
(c) In this section, "child kidnapping" and "sex offense" have the meanings given in AS
12.63.100.
(d) Failure to register as a sex offender or child kidnapper in the first degree is a class C felony§ 11.56.840 Failure to register as a sex offender or child kidnapper in the second degree.

(a) A person commits the crime of failure to register as a sex offender or child kidnapper in the
second degree if the person knowingly fails to (1) register, (2) file the written notice of change of
address, (3) file the annual or quarterly written verification, or (4) supply all of the information
required to be submitted under (1) - (3) of this subsection, as required in AS 12.63.010.
(b) Failure to register as a sex offender or child kidnapper in the second degree is a class A
misdemeanor.
§ 12.63.010 Registration of sex offenders and related requirements.

(a) A sex offender or child kidnapper who is physically present in the state shall register as
provided in this section. The sex offender or child kidnapper shall register
(1) within the 30-day period before release from an in-state correctional facility;
(2) by the next working day following conviction for a sex offense or child kidnapping if the

sex offender is not incarcerated at the time of conviction; or
(3) by the next working day of becoming physically present in the state.
(b) A sex offender or child kidnapper required to register under (a) of this section shall register
with the Department of Corrections if the sex offender or child kidnapper is incarcerated or in
person at the Alaska state trooper post or municipal police department located nearest to where
the sex offender or child kidnapper resides at the time of registration. To fulfill the registration
requirement, the sex offender or child kidnapper shall
(1) complete a registration form that includes, at a minimum,
(A) the sex offender’s or child kidnapper’s name, address, place of employment, date of birth;
(B) each conviction for a sex offense or child kidnapping for which the duty to register has not
terminated under AS 12.63.020, date of sex offense or child kidnapping convictions, place and
court of sex offense or child kidnapping convictions, whether the sex offender or child kidnapper
has been unconditionally discharged from the conviction for a sex offense or child kidnapping
and the date of the unconditional discharge; if the sex offender or child kidnapper asserts that the
offender or kidnapper has been unconditionally discharged, the offender or kidnapper shall
supply proof of that discharge acceptable to the department;
(C) all aliases used;
(D) driver’s license number;
(E) description, license numbers, and vehicle identification numbers of motor vehicles the sex
offender or child kidnapper has access to regardless of whether that access is regular or not;
(F) any identifying features of the sex offender or child kidnapper;
(G) anticipated changes of address; and
(H) a statement concerning whether the offender or kidnapper has had treatment for a mental
abnormality or personality disorder since the date of conviction for an offense requiring
registration under this chapter;
(2) allow the Alaska state troopers. Department of Corrections, or municipal police to take a
complete set of the sex offender’s or child kidnapper’s fingerprints and to take the sex offender’s
or child kidnapper’s photograph.
(c) If a sex offender or child kidnapper changes residence after having registered under (a) of
this section, the sex offender or child kidnapper shall provide written notice of the change by the
next working day following the change to the Alaska state trooper post or municipal police
department located nearest to the new residence or, if the residence change is out of slate, tothe
central registry.

(d) A sex offender or child kidnapper required to register
(1) for 15 years under (a) of this section and AS 12.63.020(a)(2) shall, annually, during the tert^
of a duty to register under AS 12.63.020, on a date set by the department at the lime of the sex
offender's or child kidnapper's initial registration, provide written verification to the department,
in the manner required by the department, of the sex offender's or child kidnapper’s address and
notice of any changes to the information previously provided under (b)( 1) of this section;
(2) for life under (a) of this section and AS 12.63.020(a)(1) shall, not less than quarterly, on a
date set by the department, provide written verification to the department, in the manner required
by the department, of the sex offender's or child kidnapper's address and any changes to the
information previously provided under (b)(1) of this section.
(e) The registration form required to be submitted under (b) of this section and the annual or
quarterly verifications must be sworn to by the offender or kidnapper and contain an admonition
that a false statement shall subject the offender or kidnapper to prosecution for perjury.
(f) In this section, "correctional facility" has the meaning given in AS 33.30.901.
§ 12.63.020 Duration of sex offender or child kidnapper duty to register.

(a) The duty of a sex offender or child kidnapper to comply with the requirements of AS
12.63.010 for each sex offense or child kidnapping
(1) continues for the lifetime of a sex offender or child kidnapper convicted of
(A) one aggravated sex offense; or
(B) two or more sex offenses, two or more child kidnappings, or one sex offense and one child
kidnapping; for purposes of this section, a person convicted of indecent exposure before a person
under 16 years of age under AS 11.41.460 more than two times has been convicted of two or
more sex offenses;
(2) ends 15 years following the sex offender's or child kidnapper's unconditional discharge from
a conviction for a single sex offense that is not an aggravated sex offense or for a single child
kidnapping if the sex offender or child kidnapper has supplied proof that is acceptable to the
department of the unconditional discharge; the registration period under this paragraph
(A) is tolled for each year that a sex offender or child kidnapper
(i) fails to comply with the requirements of this chapter;
(ii) is incarcerated for the offense or kidnapping for which the offender or kidnapper is required
to register or for any other offense;

(B) may include the time a sex offender or child kidnapper was absent from this stale if the sex
offender or child kidnapper has complied with any sex offender or child kidnapper registration
requirements of the jurisdiction in which the offender or kidnapper was located and if the sex
offender or child kidnapper provides the department with proof of the compliance while the sex
offender or child kidnapper was absent from this state; and
(C) continues for a sex offender or child kidnapper who has not supplied proof acceptable to the
department of the offender's or kidnapper's unconditional discharge for the sex offense or child
kidnapping requiring registration.
(b) The department shall adopt, by regulation, procedures to notify a sex offender or child
kidnapper who, on the registration form under AS 12.63.010, lists a conviction for a sex offense
or child kidnapping that is a violation of a former law of this state or a law of another
jurisdiction, of the duration of the offender’s or kidnapper's duty under (a) of this section for that
sex offense or child kidnapping. As a part of the regulations, the department shall require the
offender or kidnapper to supply proof acceptable to the department of unconditional discharge
and the date it occurred.
§ 12.63.030 Notification of other jurisdictions.

(a) If a sex offender or child kidnapper notifies the department that the sex offender or child
kidnapper is moving from the state, the department shall notify the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the state where the sex offender or child kidnapper is moving of the sex
offender's or child kidnapper’s intended address.
(b) If a sex offender or child kidnapper fails to register or to verify the sex offender's or child
kidnapper's address and registration under this chapter, or the department does not know the
location of a sex offender or child kidnapper required to register under this chapter, the
department shall immediately notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
§ 12.63.100 Definitions.

In this chapter,
(1) "aggravated sex offense" means
(A) a crime under AS 11.41.100(a)(3), or a similar law of another jurisdiction, in which the
person committed or attempted to commit a sexual offense, or a similar offense under the laws of
the other jurisdiction; in this subparagraph, "sexual offense" has the meaning given in AS
11.41.100(a)(3);
(B) a crime under AS 11.41.110(a)(3), or a similar law of another jurisdiction, in which the
person committed or attempted to commit one of the following crimes, or a similar law of
another jurisdiction:
(i) sexual assault in the first degree;

(ii) sexual assault in the second degree;
(iii) sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree; or
(iv) sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree; or
(C) a crime, or an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit a crime, under AS 11.41.410,
11.41.434, or a similar law of another jurisdiction;
(2) "child kidnapping" means
(A) a crime under AS 11.41.100(a)(3), or a similar law of another jurisdiction, in which the
person committed or attempted to commit kidnapping;
(B) a crime under AS 11.41.110(a)(3), or a similar law of another jurisdiction, in which the
person committed or attempted to commit kidnapping if the victim was under 18 years of age at
the time of the offense; or
(C) a crime, or an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit a crime, under AS 11.41.300,
or a similar law of another jurisdiction, if the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the
offense;
(3) "conviction" means that an adult, or a juvenile charged as an adult under AS 47.12 or a
similar procedure in another jurisdiction, has entered a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or
nolo contendere, or has been found guilty or guilty but mentally ill by a court or jury, of a sex
offense or child kidnapping regardless of whether the judgment was set aside under AS
12.55.085 or a similar procedure in another jurisdiction or was the subject of a pardon or other
executive clemency; "conviction" does not include a judgment that has been reversed or vacated
by a court.
(4) "department" means the Department of Public Safety;
(5) "sex offender or child kidnapper" means a person convicted of a sex offense or child
kidnapping in this state or another jurisdiction regardless of whether the conviction occurred
before, after, or on January 1, 1999;
(6) "sex offense" means
(A) a crime under AS 11.41.100(a)(3), or a similar law of another jurisdiction, in which the
person committed or attempted to commit a sexual offense, or a similar offense under the laws of
the other jurisdiction; in this subparagraph, "sexual offense" has the meaning given in AS
11.41.100(a)(3);
(B) a crime under AS 11.41.110(a)(3), or a similar law of another jurisdiction, in which the
person committed or attempted to commit one of the following crimes, or a similar law of

another j urisdiction:
(i) sexual assault in the first degree;
(ii) sexual assault in the second degree;
(iii) sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree; or
(iv) sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree;
(C) a crime, or an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit a crime, under the following
statutes or a similar law of another jurisdiction:
(i) AS 11.41.410- 11.41.438;
(ii) AS 11.41.440(a)(2);
(iii) AS 11.41.450 - 11.41.458;
(iv) AS 11.41.460 if the indecent exposure is before a person under 16 years of age and the
offender has a previous conviction for that offense;
(v) AS 11.61.125 orll.61.127;
(vi) AS 11.66.110 or 11.66.130(a)(2) if the person who was induced or caused to engage in
prostitution was 16 or 17 years of age at the time of the offense; or
(vii) former AS 11.15.120, former 11.15.134, or assault with the intent to commit rape under
former AS 11.15.160, former AS 11.40.110, or former 11.40.200;
(7) "unconditional discharge" has the meaning given in AS 12.55.185.
§ 18.65.087 Central registry of sex offenders.

(a) The Department of Public Safety shall maintain a central registry of sex offenders and child
kidnappers and shall adopt regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of this section and AS
12.63. A post of the Alaska state troopers or a municipal police department that receives
registration or change of address information under AS 12.63.010 shall forw'ard the information
within five working days of receipt to the central registry of sex offenders and child kidnappers.
Unless the sex offender or child kidnapper provides proof satisfactory to the department that the
sex offender or child kidnapper is not physically present in the state or that the time limits
described in AS 12.63.010 have passed, the Department of Public Safety may enter and maintain
in the registry information described in AS 12.63.010 about a sex offender or child kidnapper
that the department obtains from
(1) the sex offender or child kidnapper under AS 12.63;

(2) a post of the Alaska state troopers or a municipal police department under (a) of this section:
(3) a coun judgment under AS 12.55.148;
(4) the Depanment of Corrections under AS 33.30.012 or 33.30.035;
(5) the Federal Bureau of Investigation or another sex offender registration agency outside this
state if the information indicates that a sex offender or child kidnapper is believed to be residing
or planning to reside in the state or cannot be located;
(6) a criminal justice agency in the state or another jurisdiction;
(7) the department's central repository under AS 12.62; information entered in the registry from
the repository is not subject to the requirements of AS 12.62.160(c)(3) or (4); or
(8) another reliable source as defined in regulations adopted by the department.
(b) Information about a sex offender or child kidnapper that is contained in the central registry,
including sets of fingerprints, is confidential and not subject to public disclosure except as to the
sex offender's or child kidnapper’s name, aliases, address, photograph, physical description,
description of motor vehicles, license numbers of motor vehicles, and vehicle identification
numbers of motor vehicles, place of employment, date of birth, crime for which convicted, date
of conviction, place and court of conviction, length and conditions of sentence, and a statement
as to whether the offender or kidnapper is in compliance with requirements of AS 12.63 or
cannot be located.
(c) Notwithstanding (b) of this section, if a sex offender has been convicted in this state or
another jurisdiction of a sex offense identified as "incest," that offense may be disclosed under
(b) of this section only as a "felony sexual abuse of a minor" conviction.
(d) The Department of Public Safety
(1) shall adopt regulations to
(A) allow a sex offender or child kidnapper to review sex offender or child kidnapper
registration information that refers to that sex offender or child kidnapper, and if the sex offender
or child kidnapper believes the information is inaccurate or incomplete, to request the department
to correct the information; if the department finds the information is inaccurate or incomplete,
the department shall correct or supplement the information;
(B) ensure the appropriate circulation to law enforcement agencies of information contained in
the central registry;
(C) ensure the anonymity of members of the public who request information under this section;

(2) shall provide to the Depanment of Corrections and municipal police departments the forms
and directions necessary to allow sex offenders and child kidnappers to comply with AS
12.63.010;
(3) may adopt regulations to establish fees to be charged for registration under AS 12.63.010
and for information requests; the fee for registration shall be based upon the actual costs of
performing the registration and maintaining the central registry but may not be set at a level
whereby registration is discouraged; the fee for an information request may not be greater than
SIO;
(4) shall remove from the central registry of sex offenders and child kidnappers under this
section information about a sex offender or child kidnapper required to register under AS
12.63.020(a)(2) at the end of the sex offender’s or child kidnapper's duty to register if the
offender or kidnapper has not been convicted of another sex offense or child kidnapping and the
offender or kidnapper has supplied proof of unconditional discharge acceptable to the
department; in this paragraph, "sex offense" and "child kidnapping" have the meanings given in
AS 12.63.100.
(e) The name, address, and other identifying information of a member of the public who makes
an information request under this section is not a public record under AS 40.25.100 -- 40.25.220.
(f) WTicn a sex offender or child kidnapper registers under AS 12.63, the Department of Public
Safety shall make reasonable attempts to verify that the sex offender or child kidnapper is
residing at the registered address. Reasonable attempts at verifying an address include sending
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the offender or kidnapper at the registered address. The
department shall make reasonable efforts to locate an offender or kidnapper who cannot be
located at the registered address.
(g) The department, at least quarterly, shall compile a list of those persons with a duty to
register under AS 12.63.010 who have failed to register, whose addresses cannot be verified
under (f) of this section, or who otherwise cannot be located. The department shall post this list
on the Internet and request the public’s assistance in locating these persons.

